Arizona Court of Appeals Division One Holds That Provisions of Arizona’s Juror-Exemption Statute Allowing Prospective Jurors 75 and Older to Opt Out of Jury Service and Prohibiting Public disclosure of Prospective Jurors’ Medical Statements Do Not Violate the Arizona Constitution.

Arizona Revised Statute § 21-202(C) allows a prospective juror at least seventy-five years of age to submit a written request to be excused from jury service. Upon service of a written request, the court is required to excuse the prospective juror. Subsection (B)(1) of that statute requires that documents submitted by a prospective juror in support of a claim of a mental or physical condition that would excuse the juror from service shall not be disclosed to the general public. On May 4, 2005, Mr. Stewart asked the municipal court to declare these provisions unconstitutional because they violate his Arizona constitutional rights to due process and a fair jury trial. The court denied the motion. Mr. Stewart then filed a petition for special action with the superior court, which accepted jurisdiction but denied relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

With respect to the opt-out provision, the Court of Appeals applied the three-part test set out in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) for establishing a prima facie violation of a defendant’s federal constitutional Sixth Amendment right to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community. In so doing, the Court rejected Stewart’s argument that it should interpret Arizona’s right to jury trial provision more broadly than the federal provision. The Duren test requires a defendant to show:
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.
The Court held that Stewart failed to meet the first requirement because age by itself does not generate sufficiently similar attitudes and ideas to constitute a “distinctive group” for purposes of the Duren test.

The Court also rejected Stewart’s assertion that the confidentiality provision of the juror-exemption statute violates his “state open justice rights – Article 2, § 11.” The Court acknowledged that Arizona’s constitution mandates public judicial proceedings, but found that the confidentiality provision did not run afoul of this constitutional requirement. Rather, the confidentiality provision accommodates the legitimate personal privacy rights of prospective jurors.

Judge Norris authored the unanimous opinion, joined by Presiding Judge Timmer and Judge Johnsen.